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1 Introduction 
Given the important role inward FDI can play in accelerating economic growth 
and transformation, developing countries are interested in attracting it. Amongst 
many other benefits such as creating employment and increasing technological 
development, inward FDI provides a more stable source of external financing than 
sources such as private debt and portfolio flows (Gastanaga et al., 1998; 
Globerman and Shapiro 2002a; Gani 2007).  
While South and East Asia and Pacific countries had long pursued the 
traditional strategy of self-reliance, FDI has become topical in the South and East 
Asia region since the late 1980s when most of the countries in the region adopted 
an open door policy to welcome FDI (for example, India in 1981 and China’s open 
door policy in 1978) (Wang, 1995). This change is seen as a result of major 
political decisions and economic development strategy so as to uplift the 
economies from their economic backwardness and reach their long term goals of 
development.  
In addition to opening doors for foreign investments, the need was felt for 
appropriate policies and for an institutional environment for economic growth. 
Most of the countries in this region have all, to varying degrees, made changes to 
their governance to make the investment environment conducive and to sustain 
foreign inflows and growth (Haggard, 2004; Lee, 2002). Needless to say, 
economic growth was needed to make any sustained and meaningful reduction in 
poverty, in reducing unemployment and improving living standards of people.   
Empirically, the effect of economic governance on FDI is widely debated in 
the case of South and East Asia and Pacific countries, leaving a scope for 
aggregating these studies to explore the genuine and the overall impact of 
governance on both inward FDI and economic growth. Motivated by the above 
reason, the aim of this study is to contribute to evidence based policy making and 
to academic research on the governance FDI relationship by providing a meta 
synthesis of empirical evidence on various measures of governance and FDI, 
identifying factors causing heterogeneity in the results, pointing to policy 
implications of our results and identifying potential avenues for future research 
within this field of study. In order to achieve the research aim, we raise the 
following questions: Is there a genuine effect of measures of governance on 
inward FDI? What is the directionality of such effect? We answer these questions 
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by using all available empirical evidence obtained using systematic literature 
review from 1980–2012 on effects of governance on inward FDI.  
The definition of economic governance has evolved over the last few years. 
According to Kaufmann et al. (1999) Governance consists of the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them. Good, transparent and efficient governance in host 
countries ensures the safety of investments and thus attracts foreigners to invest. 
While there are many international and local authorities which give both subjective 
and objective information on governance, literature in the field of governance and 
inward FDI has used four main sources. They are worldwide governance 
indicators provided by Kaufmann et al. (1996) under a World Bank project, 
Freedom House measure of voice and accountability and political rights, Polity 
dataset and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
These different data sets on the quality of governance raise the issue of 
divergence in various measures of governance measured by these institutions. In 
order to synthesise the effect of governance measures on growth, we delved deeper 
into the sub measures of each measure of governance to synthesise them based on 
the common sub measures. After observing the individual variables (representative 
sources) that have been used in measuring governance by these different data 
sources, we have classified governance into 7 measures based on World Wide 
governance measures. These seven measures are termed hereafter as voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulation, law, 
corruption and aggregate governance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a systematic 
review of literature with Section 3 outlining the methodology used in the study. 
Section 4 presents results followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2 Literature review 
While it is generally believed that good governance in a host country helps in 
attracting inward FDI, most of the empirical studies show that this is not the case. 
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A systematic literature review of these empirical papers is presented here with a 
view to unearthing the issues within the existing literature in terms of differences 
in their findings and the reasons causing such differences. 
2.1 Theoretical views on governance and inward FDI 
Two main theoretical frameworks have been used in explaining the relationship 
between economic governance and inward FDI. Firstly, Dunning’s OLI 
framework (1980) explains the various reasons for which an MNC enters into a 
host country. According to Dunning (1980) an MNC will enter a host country 
when each of the ownership, location and organisation factors are met. In this 
context, economic governance can be seen as a location factor which might deter 
investments or serve as a helping hand for foreign investors depending on the form 
of investment and the industry into which these investments flow.  
Secondly, North (1991) in his institutional theory posits that institutions in the 
form of political, economic and structural interactions are human-made constraints 
which aim to decrease the level of uncertainty and allow for firms and individuals 
to interact efficiently. While governance aims to facilitate investments, they effect 
transactions (ex: cost of protecting property rights) and transformation costs (ex: 
by effecting production interruptions) which in turn affect the profitability of such 
investments (Dahlstrom and Johnson, 2007). Both Dunning’s and North’s theories 
suggest that based on contextual factors, governance can have either positive or 
negative effects on FDI. 
2.2 Empirical view on governance and inward FDI 
Empirical studies on the measures of governance and inward FDI for the South 
and East Asia and Pacific region that have been identified in the search are: 
Gastanaga et al. (1998), Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002b), Hsiao and Shen (2003), Anghel (2004), Globerman and Shapiro (2004), 
Gani (2007), Hur et al. (2007), Adeoye (2009), Brunetti and Weder (1998), 
Wernick et al. (2009), Ali et al. (2010), He et al. (2011), Muhammad et al. (2011), 
Jadhav (2012), Luca and Spatafora (2012), Habib and Zurawicki (2001), Wei 
(2000), Teksoz (2004), Voyer and Beamish (2004), Straub (2005), Dahlstrom and 
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Johnson (2007), Khamfula (2007), Brouthers et al.(2008), Cole et al.(2009), Sadig 
(2009), Woo and Heo (2009),Qian et al.(2012) and Mathur and Singh (2013), Nigh 
and Schollhammer (1987), Singh and Jun (1995), Busse and Hefeker (2005), Baek 
and Qian (2011), Zheng (2011) and Driffield et al. (2012), Seyoum (1996), Lee 
and Mansfield (1996), Ahn et al.(1998), Li and Resnick (2003), Nunnenkamp and  
Spatz (2004), Ahlquist (2008), Mayer (2006), Elo (2007), Yackee (2008), Zhang 
and Fu (2008), Akisik and Pfeiffer (2009), Rai (2009), Azemar and Desbordes 
(2010), Binici (2010), Goodspeed et al. (2010), Arbatli (2011), Davis (2011) and 
Gordon et al. (2012), Cyrus et al. (2006), Fan et al. (2009), Arbatli (2011), Busse 
et al. (2011), Wang et al. (2011), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Addision and 
Heshmati (2003), Jensen (2003), Li and Resnick (2003), Jensen and McGillivray 
(2005), Busse (2004), Blanton and Blanton (2007), Choi (2008), Guerin and 
Manzocchi (2009), Doces (2010). All these studies are grouped based on the 
measure of governance namely, voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulation, law, corruption and aggregate governance. 
Voice and accountability capture the extent to which citizens in a country have 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and media and have a voice in the 
government (Wernick and Haar, 2009). Voice and accountability can affect FDI by 
inclusion or exclusion of public opinion on investments which can in turn allow or 
deter foreign investments (Gani, 2007). Studies by Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002a), Jadhav (2012), Woo and Heo (2009), Busse and Hefeker (2005), Zheng 
(2011), Li and Resnick (2003), Davis (2011), Gordon et al. (2012), Harms and 
Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003), Jensen and McGillivray (2005), Busse (2004), 
Blanton and Blanton (2007), Choi (2008), Guerin and Manzocchi (2009) and 
Doces (2010) have reached mixed conclusions on the role of voice and 
accountability on inward FDI.  
On the one hand, results reported by Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), Busse 
and Hefeker (2005), Zheng (2011), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Jensen (2003), 
Jensen and McGillivray (2005), Busse (2004), Blanton and Blanton (2007), Choi 
(2008) and Doces (2010) show that voice and accountability have a positive and 
significant effect on FDI. On the other hand Jadhav (2012) and Guerin and 
Manzocchi (2009) show that voice and accountability have a negative and 
significant effect on FDI. Others like Woo and Heo (2009), Li and Resnick (2003) 
and Gordon et al. (2012) report mixed results. 
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Political stability measures the solidity of government to political shocks, 
terrorism and domestic violence which can eventually reduce the risk of doing 
business and deter investments. Presumably foreign investors would like to invest 
in countries with political stability to ensure the continuity of policies by 
government. Studies focusing on this measure of governance are Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002a), Anghel (2004), Jadhav (2012), Singh and Jun (1995), Busse and 
Hefeker (2005), Baek and Qian (2011), Gordon et al.(2012), Busse et al.(2011) 
have generated mixed results. While Anghel (2004), Baek and Qian (2011) and 
Busse et al. (2011) found a positive and significant effect, the negative and 
insignificant effect is shown by Jadhav (2012). 
Government effectiveness measures the quality of public services and the 
insulation of those services from political pressure. Through government 
effectiveness, government can exert discretionary power on economic activities by 
designing and implementing economic policies which can either deter or 
encourage investments (Globerman and Shapiro 2002a, Anghel, 2004). Studies by 
Gastanaga et al. (1998), Arbatli (2011), Gordon et al. (2012) and Jensen (2003) 
show mixed effects of government effectiveness on FDI under different models. 
Regulation as one of the elements of governance indicators is the wide and 
diverse measure as it includes regulation related to aspects such as intellectual 
property rights, environment regulations, restrictive capital controls, accounting 
standards and corporate governance and tax and tariffs. Regulation captures the 
ability of a government in generating these policies and using them to promote 
private sector development. Through these policies, regulation can affect FDI as 
they can either speed up or delay the investments alongside affecting the cost of 
investments.  There have been only three studies that have looked at the impact of 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), Jadhav (2012), Gordon et al. (2012) which 
reported positive and significant, positive and insignificant and mixed effect 
respectively leaving a scope for both further research and conclusive results.  
The law can affect investments through various legal institutions and property 
rights protection. This measure also includes the quality of contract enforcement, 
the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime. In a country where there are 
weak legal institutions and property rights protection, very few foreign investors 
would like to invest as it would put their investments at risk and vice versa. The 
positive and significant effect is shown by Anghel (2004), Gani (2007), Jadhav 
(2012) and Fan et al. (2009). While Globerman and Shapiro (2002a) have shown 
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the positive and insignificant effect of the rule of law, Arbatli (2011) has shown a 
negative and insignificant effect. Studies by Busse and Hefeker (2005) and Gordon 
et al. (2012) have reported mixed effects. 
Corruption is viewed as one of the important measures of governance as it has 
an important bearing on investments. Corruption measures the extent to which 
public goods are misused or used for private purposes by individuals. However, 
corruption cannot be considered in isolation from other governance related factors 
as bad governance is closely associated with corruption. Studies by Gastanaga et 
al. (1998), Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), Hsiao and Shen (2003), Anghel 
(2004), Gani (2007), Jadhav (2012), Habib and Zurawicki (2001), Wei (2000), 
Teksoz (2004), Voyer and Beamish (2004), Straub (2005), Dahlstrom and Johnson 
(2007), Khamfula (2007), Sadig (2009), Mathur and Singh (2013), Woo and Heo 
(2009), Goodspeed et al. (2010), Gordon et al. (2012) and Jensen (2003) have 
focused on the effect of corruption on inward FDI. 
Corruption is considered to affect foreign investments in two ways – increase 
in cost of investments leading to decrease in profitability of such investments and 
increase in uncertainty levels in the host country. Some studies have also shown 
that corruption ‘greases the wheels’ of investments rather than ‘sands the wheels 
of investment’ (Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), Gastanaga et al. (1998), Hsiao 
and Shen (2003) and Teksoz (2004)).  
Finally, Globerman and Shapiro (2002b), Globerman and Shapiro (2004), Hur 
et al. (2007), Adeoye (2009), Wernick, Haar and Singh (2009), Ali et al.,(2010), 
Muhammad et al. (2011), Luca and Spatafora (2012), Ahlquist (2008), Goodspeed 
et al. (2010), Gordon et al. (2012) have focused on the effect of aggregate 
governance on inward FDI. Overall governance includes various political, legal 
and institutional factors in a country that can have a bearing on investments. While 
governance is expected to show a positive effect on foreign investments by 
providing impartial, effective and efficient conditions to operate, there is no 
conclusive evidence on this.  
Mixed results and seemingly contradictory arguments on the empirical 
relationship between measures of governance and inward FDI can be attributed to 
various measurements, conceptual and methodological differences in these studies 
(Appendix 5). Given this situation, policy makers may be uncertain as to what 
kind of policy they should propose in order to create a favourable investment 
climate for foreign investors in terms of economic governance.  
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In order to address the above inconclusiveness, as outlined in the introduction 
section this study has the following research aims; firstly, to deal with the effect of 
measures of governance on inward FDI and secondly with respect to 
heterogeneity. With regards to the effect, the following two questions are raised: 
firstly, is there any genuine effect of each measure of governance (voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulation, corruption 
and rule of law) on the inward FDI into South and East Asia and Pacific countries? 
Secondly, what is the directionality of such effect? With respect to differences in 
reported results the following questions will be answered. Why do governance and 
FDI studies report such divergent results? Is the heterogeneity due to the data 
generating process or is it due to differences in research design? An overall 
summary of this study is given in Appendix 6. 
2.3 Methodology 
The review methodology used in this thesis, i.e the methods used for searching 
studies, study selection, critical evaluation and data extraction is informed by three 
sources. First, Cambell and Cochrane Collaboration guidelines for systematic 
reviews in health care and social policy; second, Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination (CRD, 2009) of the University of York; third, Evidence for Policy 
and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) of the Institute 
of Education. Data analysis is informed by Doucouliagos et al. (2010), 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). 
Reporting guidelines are informed by Stanley et al. (2013). 
We started by establishing a pre-established search criteria to identify all 
studies in the English language on measures of the dependent variable (FDI) and 
independent variable (governance). This is done in two stages: the first stage 
involves identifying databases for published and unpublished studies. The second 
stage involves specifying key words, searching databases and storing results.  
For published studies, databases such as EBSCO host (Business and 
economics database), web of knowledge (social sciences), International 
Bibliography of the social sciences (Economics, politics, sociology, anthropology 
and Economics), Science direct (science and humanities), Swetswise and JSTOR 
(social sciences) were used. For unpublished studies, databases such as World 
Bank e-library, Harvard Kennedy e-library, Asian Development Bank e-library, 
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National Bureau of economic research and IMF e-library were used. In addition to 
these databases, two search engines, namely Google scholar and web of 
knowledge provided by University of Greenwich were utilised. In addition to the 
above, manual search was performed in order to identify grey literature using two 
approaches – snowball approach and random search of studies in 5 journals. Under 
the snowball approach we have started with the reference list of studies identified 
through systematic review and proceeded to find new studies. These exhaustive 
searches were carried out to identify all possible studies on measures of 
governance and inward FDI. 
With a pre-defined list of key words for measures of governance and inward 
FDI (Appendix 1), ‘title’, ‘abstract’, ‘text’ and ‘keyword’ was searched in the 
above databases. The time period of the study was January 1980 – December 
2012. A total number of 4996 studies were retrieved which have analysed the 
relationship between measures of governance and inward FDI. From this, 150 and 
109 duplicate studies were removed using automatic and manual duplicate 
searches respectively. This left a total of 4728 unique studies for further screening. 
Figure 1 summarises the methodology used in this study. 
The relevance of each study was checked based on whether the study estimates 
or analyses the relationship between measures of governance and inward FDI? 
While the earlier study is coded as ‘E’, later ones are coded are ‘T’. If a study 
estimates and analyses the relationship, then it is coded as ‘TE’. Studies which do 
not satisfy any of these criteria are not included in meta-analysis. 131 studies were 
selected from the initial screening stage and these were considered for the critical 
evaluation stage. This was done using PIOS (Population-Independent variable-
Outcome variable-Study design) criteria (Appendix 2). While 94, 62, 68 and 94 
studies have satisfied population, independent variable, outcome variable and 
study design respectively, only 40 studies have satisfied all four criteria (Appendix 
3). Another 8 studies were added to this number by hand searching, making a total 
of 48 studies for meta-analysis. Our exclusive search for studies on South Korea 
did not result in any records. 
The following data were obtained from 48 studies. Firstly, bibliographical 
information such as name of the first author and the University, year of publication 
of study and type of study (whether it is a published or unpublished study). 
Secondly, study characteristics such as a kind of data used, information on 
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Figure 1: Summary of methodology used in the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dependent and independent variables such as their functional form and their data 
sources, and estimation methods. Thirdly, outcome related information such as 
estimated parameters, t-values, standard errors, P-value, Z-value, F-value for 
linear, non linear and squared terms was obtained.  
The general form of econometric model used in the primary empirical studies 
with linear terms only (Equation 1) and that with linear, nonlinear and squared 
terms (Equation 2) is shown below:  
Databases for published studies = 5, Databases for 
working papers and reports = 5 and Google scholar, WOK 
Total record (4996) – duplicates (automatic 150  
+ manual 109) = 4728 unique record 
Search for South Korea = 666 · 
Duplicates 59 (automatic 26 + 
Manual 33) = 607 Unique 
records 
Records remaining after title and 
abstract reading 131 
Studies satisfying 
population = 94 
Studies satisfying 
Independent 
variable = 62 
Studies satisfying 
outcome = 68 
Studies satisfying 
study design = 94 
Hand search (Snowball 
approach + Journal search) 
= 8 
De-select = 91 
None 
Select = 40 
Total studies 48 
All PIOS  
satisfied 
No 
Yes 
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Yit = α0 + α1Xit + γFit + εit (1)  
Yit = α0 + α1Xit + α2Xit · Kit + α3 X2it + γFit + εit  (2) 
 
In above equations,  
Y – Inward FDI 
X – Measures of governance,  
F – Vector of other variables 
i – Country indices 
t – Time indices 
α0 – Constant term 
α1 – Marginal effect of governance on Y 
X · K – Interaction term of measures of governance with K 
X2 – Non-linear term of measures of governance 
α2 – Measures the effect of X.K on inward FDI conditional on the value of K 
α3 – Measures the effect of X2 on Y conditional on its own value 
ε – Random error term 
The effect size is measured using partial correlation to allow for meaningful 
comparison across different models. Various estimates of α1 are converted into 
partial correlations using the formula r = [t/√ (t2 + dof). Where, t stands for t-
statistics of the multiple regression coefficient, dof stands for the degrees of 
freedom of the respective t-statistics. 
2.4 Modelling simple and meta-regression analysis 
The following equation is used for simple meta-regression analysis for estimating 
the overall effect after correcting for publication bias:1 
rij = β0 + β1 SE2ij + εij equation  (3) 
_________________________ 
1 Publication bias is tested using Funnel Asymmetric Test (FAT) and Precision Effect Test (PET). 
FAT-PET is estimated using equation ti = β1 + β0 (1/SEi) + vi  (where FAT is H0: β1 = 0 and PET is 
H0: β0 = 0). These aspects are explored in a different study. 
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The following equation is used for multiple meta-regression analysis for 
estimating the overall effect after correcting for publication bias: 
rij = β0 + β1 SE2ij + + β2Xij + εij equation (4) 
The following equation is used for multiple meta-regression analysis with 
study and journal specific moderator variables:  
rij = β0 + β1 SE2ij + β2Xij + β3Zj + εij  (5) 
i = Estimate 
j = Journal 
r = Partial correlation coefficient 
SE = Standard error 
SE2= Squared standard error 
β0= Shows the effect of independent variable on dependent after correcting for 
publication bias 
β1= coefficient of SE2 
β2= Coefficient of other factors such as real world 
β3= Coefficient of study and author related factors 
εi = Error term 
X = Estimate specific covariates 
Z = Journal specific covariates 
It is worth highlighting at this point that while some studies have defined r on a 
scale of 0–1 from low to high governance, others have used it as 0–1 high to low 
governance. In order to aggregate estimates, we have rescaled all estimates as 0–1 
low to high governance. This was done by inverting and multiplying both 
coefficients and standard errors of estimates defined on the opposite scale (i.e. 0–1 
high – low governance) by –1. 
2.5 Discussion of results 
We present and analyse results of simple meta-regression analysis (SMRA) and 
multiple meta-regression analysis in this section. Before that, funnel plots and 
graphs of chronological order of estimates are presented. These graphs are used in 
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order to offer a clear picture of the state of empirical knowledge in governance 
FDI studies. 
2.5.1 Funnel plots 
Figure 2: Funnel Plots for measures of governance and FDI estimation2 
 
Figure 2 continued 
_________________________ 
2 We did not plot funnel graph for Voice and Accountability as the number of observations are 
fewer. 
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Figure 2 continued 
 
Figure 2 presents estimates of measures of governance and inward FDI are 
plotted on the funnel plot. Funnel plot is used to trace the relationship between the 
effect size which is measured using partial correlation (shown on the X axis) and 
its precision measured as the inverse of the standard error (shown on the Y axis). 
While high precision estimates are generally few and are compactly distributed at 
the top of the funnel, low precision estimates are at the bottom of the funnel and 
are widely distributed. One possible reason for the wide dispersion of estimates 
(which is the case in most of the graphs) is publication bias.3 (Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu, 2008). In each of the above graphs, the centre of the plot represents 
the estimated true underlying effect of the respective measure of growth. In 
contrast to graphs of political stability, the other graphs show wide dispersion of 
governance-inward FDI values around the central value. 
  
_________________________ 
3 We have tested for publication bias using Funnel Asymmetric Test (FAT) and Precision Effect Test 
(PET). Despite the presence of publication bias, PET results suggest that there is genuine effect of 
each measure of governance on FDI along with aggregate governance. However, they are not robust 
in case of corruption and aggregate governance. 
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2.5.2 Chronological order of estimates 
Figure 3: Chronological order of measures of governance and FDI estimates4 
 
 
Figure 3 continued 
 
 
_________________________ 
4 We did not plot chronological graph for Voice and Accountability as the number of observations 
are fewer. 
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Figure 3 continued 
 
Figure 3 shows the chronological order of estimates of measures of governance 
on inward FDI. X-axis shows the end year of sample period and the Y axis shows 
partial correlation. Chronological ordering of graphs offers an insight into the 
evolution of effect sizes and highlights the trends. With the exception of voice and 
accountability and political stability graphs, we see a downward trend in the 
estimates5. The downward trend has an important economic interpretation as it 
indicates that governance over a period of time has a declining effect on inward 
FDI as opposed to the initial years of investment. As an alternative explanation, 
the downward trend can also be due to the fact that the econometric techniques 
have gotten better at controlling econometric problems and therefore smaller 
estimates are found. 
2.5.3 Simple meta-regression analysis 
Table 1 shows unweighted and weighted simple meta-regression results of 
individual measures of governance on inward FDI. As can be noted, all 
unweighted estimates are with positive sign, indicating that a higher measure of 
each measure leads to more FDI. For instance, tighter regulations are associated 
with more FDI. In the case of corruption, the results should be read inversely (due 
_________________________ 
5 We see the same downward trend in these graphs taking end year of sample period instead of 
average year. 
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to rescaling) i.e. more corruption leads to less FDI. A positive effect of aggregate 
governance in the last column indicates that better governance is good for FDI.  
Except for corruption, all the estimates are significant and unreliable as the R2 
value of each of these measures is very low (R2 value ranges from 0.002 for 
aggregate governance to 0.33 for regulation). In addition to lower R2 values, 
another shortcoming with this method of estimation is that the unweighted method 
treats all estimates equally with equal weight. Therefore, studies with a large 
number of estimates can have an undue influence on the statistical assessment. 
Therefore, these results can be biased and misleading. Hence, following Stanley 
and Doucouliagos (2012), we ran the above models using the weighted least 
squares method where estimates are weighed by precision. We calculate precision 
as the inverse of the standard error as it is proven to be the optimal way of 
calculating weights from a statistical point of view. 
When estimates are weighted by precision it is noted that, the size and 
significance of all measures have changed. A change in the size and significance 
of estimates indicates that undue influence by estimates is possibly removed. In 
terms of the effect, the positive effect of regulation for instance, indicates that 
more regulation is good for FDI, whereas in the case of corruption, positive effect 
indicates that more corruption is still bad for FDI.  
Table 1: Simple meta-regression analysis results 
 Political 
Stability 
(Col. 1) 
Government 
effectiveness 
 (Col. 2) 
Regulation 
 
(Col. 3) 
Law 
 
 (Col. 4) 
Corruption 
 
(Col. 5) 
Aggregate 
governance 
 (Col. 6) 
Un weighted 
estimates, β0 
(Row1) 
0.04 
(2.53) 
R2=0.04 
0.08 
(1.67) 
R2=0.01 
0.17 
(6.78) 
R2=0.33 
0.06 
(2.94) 
R2=0.09 
0.01 
(0.35) 
R2=0.10 
0.14 
(3.45) 
R2=0.002 
Estimates 
weighted by 
precision, β0 
(Row2) 
0.03 
(1.68) 
R2=0.08 
0.01 
(0.49) 
R2=0.01 
0.18 
(5.34) 
R2=0.39 
0.12 
(13.32) 
R2=0.16 
0.05 
(2.66) 
R2=0.07 
0.05 
(1.82) 
R2=0.01 
Number of 
estimates 
154 36 51 42 166 62 
Note: Values in parenthesis right below the estimate represent t-values. Each column represents 
models run with all estimates of that measure of governance. Despite of removing the effect of 
outliers, results for voice and accountability are infeasible. 
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2.5.4 Multiple regression analysis 
It can be noted that in spite of weighting these estimates, R2 values are still low, 
indicating that the above models are weak in explaining the effect of governance 
on FDI. Hence similar to unweighted results these results can be misleading. One 
possible reason for a low R2 value is due to the possible presence of heterogeneity. 
The expected value of governance FDI estimates will often depend on many other 
factors such as study, author and journal related. As these factors are unaccounted 
for, it is possible that both simple unweighted and weighted measures may capture 
the real effects of governance on FDI. Hence, we include the following moderator 
variables in order to validate simple meta-regression results. While some of the 
variables are included out of intuition (author specific variables) others are 
included as they have proven to have a significant effect in earlier meta studies 
(Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008).  
In terms of study related aspects, we have classified all studies into those that 
are published in journals and others that are not published. Estimation techniques 
used have proven to have an important effect on reported estimates. We have 
classified studies into those using OLS, panel data, time series, instrument and 
other techniques. In terms of the kind of data used, studies are grouped into panel, 
time series and cross sectional data. Sources of governance and FDI show different 
effects. In the case of FDI, data sources are grouped as the World Bank, 
UNCTAD, IMF and others. Data sources on governance are classified into World 
Wide Governance indicators, ICRG, Polity, TI, PRS, Freedom House and others. 
To test the effect of real world factors, estimates are classified into different 
regions such as South Asia, East Asia, South East Asia and mixed countries. 
Dummies for China and South Korea are used to see if inclusion of these countries 
in the sample countries makes any difference in reported results. 
Authors can differ in their values and beliefs which can influence the 
techniques they use and the results they report. In order to capture this effect, we 
have classified authors based on the university the first author is from as 
American, European, South and East Asian, and others. We believe journals from 
different disciplines can differ in reported results due to the rhetorical purposes, 
they aim to fulfil and the different audience they target. Hence, we have classified 
journals in Economics and Finance, Business Management and Accounting, Policy 
and Development. 
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Results of weighted (row1) multiple regression analysis for each measure of 
governance is shown in Table 2. As we have several estimates taken from the same 
study, it can lead to the issue of potential dependence among estimates which 
causes bias in the reported results. This potential bias is removed by running 
MMRA using cluster analysis where each study is treated as a cluster. Results of 
cluster analysis are used to validate the results obtained by the weighted method. 
Before we analyse the results, it is worth noting the following five points. First 
of all it is important to comment on the best overall fit of the models. With an 
adjusted R2 value ranging from 0. 07 for government effectiveness to 0.94 for 
political stability, these models have done a reasonable job explaining the 
heterogeneity in governance FDI literature (Stanley and Docouliagos, 2012). As 
compared to R2 values of simple meta-regression results, the explanatory power of 
these models has increased after inclusion of moderator variables. Hence, these 
estimates are more reliable as compared to simple meta-regression estimates.  
Secondly, we could not test for endogeneity due to the limited number of estimates 
(in most cases it was less than 10). Therefore, the effects reported can be due to the 
possible presence of causality. Thirdly, in terms of the statistical significance, all 
estimates are statistically significant. In the fourth instance, robustness of all these 
results are confirmed by cluster analysis. In the fifth instance, with more than 140 
estimates and an adjusted R2 value of more than 0.88, my results are highly 
reliable for political stability and corruption. In the case of other measures, my 
results are slightly less reliable as either adjusted R2 value is implausibly high or 
they have fewer numbers of estimates. In the sixth instance, all these results are 
retrieved after removing the effect of outliers.6 
Firstly, in contrast to the results reported by Globerman and Shapiro (2002a), 
Zheng (2011), Li and Resnick (2003), Jensen (2003), Jensen and McGillivray 
(2005), Busse (2004), Blanton and Blanton (2007), Choi (2008) and Doces (2010) 
my results show that voice and accountability have a negative effect on inward 
FDI. Despite removing the effect of outliers, results for this measure of 
governance are remained negative and infeasible. Further research is needed, 
before any firm conclusions are reached. Nevertheless, the negative effect of voice 
and accountability indicates that low levels of this measure in these countries are 
 
_________________________ 
6 Precision more than 200. 
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Table 2: Multiple Meta-Regression Results7 
Political Stability Government Effectiveness Regulation Law Corruption Aggregate Governance 
Ptype1 0.07 
(2.86) 
0.07 
(8.48) 
Yearly -0.78 
(-2.2) 
-0.78 
(-3.09) 
Yearly -0.43 
(-9.49) 
-0.43 
(-14.88) 
Yearly 0.21 
(3) 
0.21 
(9.5) 
Yearly -0.33 
(-7.39) 
-0.33 
(-6.98) 
Subject2 -1.45 
(-7.29) 
-1.45 
(-2.67) 
Method1 -0.05 
(-1.78) 
-0.05 
(-4.51) 
Lauthor2 -1.31 
(-2.05) 
-1.31 
(-2.72) 
Method2 0.06 
(1.78) 
0.06 
(0.6) 
Method1 0.15 
(6.84) 
0.15 
(15.02) 
Data1 0.19 
(11.78) 
0.19 
(43.94) 
Dumsk1 0.94 
(7.39) 
0.94 
(3.07) 
Method2 -0.12 
(-4.03) 
-0.12 
(-7.26) 
Subject1 0.60 
(1.82) 
0.6 
(2.6) 
Lauthor2 -0.29 
(-1.94) 
0.29 
(-5.99) 
Method4 0.68 
(7.86) 
0.68 
(35.84) 
Lauthor1 0.05 
(2.62) 
0.05 
(6.92) 
Dsource2 -0.44 
(-5.38) 
-0.44 
(-1.7) 
Lauthor1 -0.21 
(-7.46) 
-0.21 
(-15.91) 
Dsource3 -0.63 
(-1.85) 
-0.63 
(-2.48) 
Subject2 -0.28 
(-7.96) 
-0.28 
(-10.16) 
Subject1 0.40 
(7.84) 
0.40 
(29.34) 
Lauthor3 0.71 
(8.98) 
0.71 
(24.91) 
Dsource4 -0.42 
(-6.41) 
-0.42 
(-3.52) 
Subject3 -0.12 
(0.03) 
-0.12 
(0.03) 
(β0) 0.82 
(2.27) 
0.82 
(3.03) 
(β0) 0.63 
(13.16) 
0.63 
(15.18) 
Subject3 0.22 
(11.16) 
0.22 
(47.6) 
Dumchi1 -0.81 
(-3.1) 
-0.81 
(-24.6) 
Idsource3 -0.43 
(-4.01) 
-0.43 
(-1.83) 
Dsource1 0.75 
(18.53) 
0.75 
(5.46) 
N 34 34 N 51 51 Dsource3 -0.36 
(-6.83) 
-0.36 
(-30.76) 
Dumsk1 0.67 
(11.24) 
0.67 
(23.87) 
Idsource6 -0.43 
(-3.49) 
-0.43 
(-1.8) 
Idsource2 -0.42 
(-6.48) 
-0.42 
(-43.66) 
Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.07 0.21 Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.85 0.86 (β0) -0.29 
(-3.69) 
-0.29 
(-12.4) 
Flow1 -0.12 
(-3.83) 
-0.12 
(-11.43) 
(β0) 0.51 
(6.1) 
0.51 
(1.85) 
(β0) 0.26 
(8.87) 
0.26 
(15.18) 
      N 42 42 Dsource1 -0.18 
(-3.38) 
-0.18 
(-5.93) 
N 62 62 
N 154 154       Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.85 0.88 Idsource5 0.21 
(3.22) 
0.21 
(6.76) 
Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.63 0.67 
Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.95 0.95          Idsource7 0.75 
(14.03) 
0.75 
(23.86) 
   
            (β0) 0.28 
(1.08) 
0.28 
(4.69) 
   
            N 166 166    
            Adjusted 
R2/R2 
0.88 0.89    
Note: Values in parenthesis right below the estimate represent t-values.  
_________________________ 
7 Results of Precision Effect Test (PET) suggest that there is a genuine effect beyond publication bias in the case of each measure of governance along with aggregate governance. However, PET results are not 
robust in case of corruption and aggregate governance. 
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associated with high levels of FDI into them. These results reflect the tendency of 
MNC’s to not to invest in countries where people are given a voice to express their 
views and interests on government policies and processes.  
Secondly, the overall effect of political stability on inward FDI is found to be 
positive and significant, which are in line with the findings reported by Anghel 
(2004), Baek and Qian (2011) and Busse et al. (2011). Therefore, in general 
political stability does matter for foreign investors and it can be assumed that they 
like to invest in countries with high levels of stability. These results also suggest 
that foreign investors would not like to see frequent changes in the leadership and 
that they prefer long term government. 
Thirdly, government effectiveness has a positive and significant effect on FDI. 
A positive effect of government effectiveness indicates that higher levels of 
government effectiveness are correlated with higher levels of FDI. This contrasts 
the view that foreign investors are not happy with the cumbersome rules and tight 
procedures that affect the process and productiveness of investments (Khamfula, 
2007; Gastanaga et al., 1998 and Arbatli, 2011). However, it is worth noting that 
with the lowest number of observations and a lower R2 value, results for this 
measure are not strong enough. The lack of government effectiveness data may 
have caused biggest challenge in this area of research. Hence, further research is 
advised in this field of study before any strong conclusions can be made. 
In the fourth instance, while on the one hand, effective and efficient policies 
along with incentives can attract foreign investments (Globerman and Shapiro, 
2002a), on the other hand burdensome regulations can negate such investments 
(Jadhav, 2012). MMRA results on regulatory quality suggest that tighter 
regulations or regulations enforced in friendly manner are preferred by foreign 
investors as it has a positive and statistically significant impact on FDI. Therefore, 
my results contrast the view that reducing the regulatory burden and making 
regulations easier for foreign investors would attract more FDI (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2002b). 
In the fifth instance, my results on rule of law contrast Arbatli (2011)’s view 
that a strong and impartial legal system is not preferred by foreign investors as the 
rule of law has a negative and statistically significant effect on inward FDI. As one 
would expect stronger laws to facilitate and protect investments, the negative 
effect of law contradicts this view (Anghel, 2004; Gani, 2007; Jadhav, 2012; Fan 
et al., 2009). This shows a need for host country governments to develop their 
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legal systems further and incline them in favour of foreign investors. Similar to the 
government effectiveness measure, despite a higher R2 value, we have a limited 
number of observations for this measure and hence these results must be 
interpreted carefully. 
In the sixth instance, a positive sign of corruption indicates that the higher the 
corruption, lower is inward FDI. This suggests that foreign investors view 
corruption as an extra cost of operation rather than viewing it as helping hand. My 
results are not in line with the literature arguing that corruption is good for foreign 
investors (Gastanaga et al., 1998; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002a; Teksoz, 2004; 
Voyer and Beamish, 2004; Khamfula, 2007; Mathur and Singh, 2013). Negative 
effects inform us that investors prefer not to invest in countries with high 
corruption or where there is a lack of anti-enforcement laws. Results in corruption 
confirm the view that corruption sands the wheels of investment rather than 
greasing them.  
Lastly, with 65 observations, aggregate governance has a positive effect on 
inward FDI. From this result, it can be inferred that the higher the governance 
quality, the more attractive it is for foreign investors. While improved governance 
is important for the general wellbeing of the individuals, my results suggest that it 
also helps in attracting foreign investments. My results negate the view that, 
foreign investors are discouraged by extra cost and delays that are often associated 
with high levels of governance rather than seeing it as an advantage (Goodspeed et 
al., 2011). Nevertheless, R2 value is only 0.67 suggesting that the model does not 
fully explain the effect of governance on FDI. 
Based on the higher values of R2 and with observations of more than 140, my 
results are strong enough for voice and accountability, political stability and 
corruption. Hence, we can safely suggest that the countries in South and East Asia 
and Pacific regions aiming to attract FDI must focus on these three measures of 
governance. In the case of the other four measures of governance, we see a need 
for further research to reach any conclusions. 
Before we analyse the effect of moderating variables, it is important to note 
that, except for regulation models using a probit model all other results are robust 
including clustering on the regression. Using the general to specific model, 
insignificant factors were eliminated (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). Twenty 
eight variables reflecting the characteristics of study, real world, author and journal 
have shown to have an important effect on reported estimates. For each of the 
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governance measures, only factors that have caused a noticeable impact on 
reported results are presented in the table and only interesting, unexpected or 
surprising results are discussed below.  
In the case of study related factors, whether a particular study has been 
published or not in an academic journal matters as it is statistically significant and 
have reported higher effects in the case of political stability as compared to 
estimates from unpublished studies. For instance, published studies on an average 
have reported a value of 0.33 as opposed to an overall effect of 0.26. Except in 
case of law, estimates using yearly data on FDI show a negative effect with 
reference to those using non-yearly data. This could presumably be because 
governance takes time to show its impact on FDI. There is also evidence to 
suggest that estimation techniques matter for a governance FDI relationship. 
Models estimated using OLS and Probit techniques proved to be statistically 
significant compared to estimates estimated using other methods. Governance and 
FDI data sources also mattered. 
Under real world factors, as expected, country composition of the sample did 
matter as there were few regionally specific effects. For instance, models including 
China in their list of sample countries have reported an average effect of –0.81 
which is lower than those which did not include China. Similarly, inclusion of 
South Korea mattered as reported results are higher (i.e. 0.67) in case of corruption 
as opposed to an overall effect of 0.28. Thus we infer that governance FDI 
association did alter with the inclusion or exclusion of any particular region. These 
results are consistent with the notion that there can be many country specific 
factors that can have an important bearing on how governance works. It is 
interesting for future research to explore the reasons behind such differential 
impacts. 
In the case of author related aspects, with the exception of political stability, 
law, corruption and aggregate governance, European authors seem to be 
consistently different in their results compared to other authors. For instance, 
reported results of government effectiveness and regulation are weak, i.e. –1.31 
and –0.29 respectively by European authors than other authors i.e. 0.82 and 0.63 
respectively. Such an emphasis on these factors shows that European authors view 
these factors to be less important than others. Probably because they see 
government effectiveness and regulation as a part of life, they lay less stress on 
these factors. Similarly, American authors have emphasised less on political 
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stability and more on the corruption. It is an interesting issue for future research to 
see why European and American experience is different in these aspects compared 
to other authors. 
We also find that discipline specific journals are statistically significant. For 
instance, compared to studies from the Law, those from Economics and Finance 
discipline tend to place more emphasis on government effectiveness and law. 
Surprisingly, studies from Business Management and Accounting discipline under 
emphasise the importance of regulations and overall governance in attracting FDI. 
One possible reason for this could be that these disciplines view regulations to be 
less important in attracting FDI than in protecting such investments. Studies from 
Policy discipline view law to be more important for FDI. While these results 
suggest that the type of estimates reported differ across different types of journals, 
it is interesting to explore this matter further to understand if it is really discipline, 
that’s causing the difference or if it is due to some other discipline related factors. 
The inclusion of other variables which are not reported in the table did not make 
any difference to reported results. 
3 Conclusions 
South and East Asia and Pacific countries have during the past decade or so begun 
liberalising their economic policies in order to create a favourable governance 
environment for FDI. However, whether or not such governance has helped these 
countries to attract FDI remains inconclusive. The aim of this study was to assess 
the role of measures of governance on inward FDI in order to reduce the 
inconclusiveness in this field. Using 771 estimates from 48 empirical studies 
conducted from 1980–2012, this study meta-synthesised the overall effect of each 
measure of governance on inward foreign direct investment. The study has also 
identified factors that have caused heterogeneity in the reported results.  
The main message of this study is that each measure of governance has an 
important effect on FDI. In comparison to less regulated and high corrupt 
countries meta-regression results show that countries with high regulation and low 
levels of corruption are able to attract more FDI. Countries with stronger legal 
systems are positively related to inward FDI. As expected, aggregate governance is 
found to have a positive effect on inward FDI. It is important to note that with a 
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large number of observations and high R2 values, my results are strong in the case 
of voice and accountability, political stability and corruption. These results also 
confirm the growing importance of the role played by governance on investments 
as suggested by North (1990) and Dunnings (1980). 
This study has also shown that various study, real world, author and journal 
related aspects have caused significant difference to reported results in this field of 
study.  An interesting finding that has emerged from this study is that American 
authors have been shown to be consistently different in reporting the effects of 
government effectiveness, political stability and aggregate governance. Journal 
discipline did make a difference to the reported results. As expected, regional 
effects such as inclusion of China and South Korea in the list of sample countries 
did matter. Hence the effect of all moderating variables must be taken on board, 
while interpreting these results. 
Despite the useful findings, this study is subject to a number of caveats. The 
first and foremost caveat of this study is to do with the choice of sample countries 
and time period. This limitation would mean that the results are restricted to South 
and East Asia and Pacific countries and can only be generalised to those countries 
with similar governance and investment conditions. Secondly, in addition to 
showing direct effects, it is possible that governance affects FDI indirectly through 
its interaction with macro-economic factors among others. This study has only 
assessed the direct effects of measures of governance on inward FDI mainly due to 
the limited and diverse nature of both interaction8 and non-linear terms9. This has 
been a common problem with several other meta-analysis studies and thus 
highlights the need for more extensive research in this field with interaction and 
non-linear terms.  
Thirdly, the quality of results in this study is as good as the quality of studies 
included in meta-regression analysis. In the fourth instance, this study offers a 
general picture of the role of measures of governance on FDI. This limitation 
means that it does not look into the specific effects of sub measures of each 
measure of governance on FDI. Last but not least, it is important to note that 
governance can be measured in terms of the number of assassinations, riots and 
_________________________ 
8 There were about 15 different types of interaction terms ranging from a minimum of 1 to a 
maximum of 11 observations. 
9 There were only 2 different non-linear terms with less than 12 observations. 
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fines charged for violations of law and not just as a scale. However, we have only 
included studies which have defined governance as scale, and have excluded those 
that have defined it in terms of number. Whether or not the results of this study 
significantly differ if a wider definition of governance is considered is question-
able. 
The following directions for future research are suggested. Firstly, one 
important caveat of the empirical studies on measures of governance and inward 
FDI is that most of the studies have used the country as a unit of analysis. 
Presumably, the effect of governance in attracting inward FDI can differ regionally 
and is also based on the motive of FDI within one nation. Whether results on the 
effect of governance on inward FDI would significantly differ if it were possible to 
carry out research at the regional level or by sector is uncertain (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2002b).  
Secondly, most of the proxies used by existing studies in measuring economic 
governance in a country are subjective and perception based. The estimations 
reported by these studies are driven by subjective indices. In addition to this, the 
unanticipated negative effect of governance raises questions on whether these 
measures actually measure what has to be measured. This leaves an opportunity 
for future research to use more objective measures of governance by considering 
factual information on governance such as those provided by using the Business 
Database provided by the World Bank (2006). Another interesting direction for 
future research would be analysing the effects of economic governance on inward 
FDI separately by taking up country level studies. This would be informative for 
the dynamic effects of measures of governance on inward FDI and would also 
control for country level heterogeneity.  
To conclude, based on the results of this study it can be safely suggested that 
without designing and implementing governance in an appropriate manner, 
attracting high levels of FDI might not be possible. Our results have important 
policy implications. Efforts towards raising the quality of institutions by designing 
and implementing policies that further political stability, regulation and overall 
governance is advised. Policy makers should design and enforce policies that let 
government be more accountable for its actions along with appropriate legal 
systems. All possible formal and informal mechanisms that aid in enhancing the 
quality of accountability of government and those that give more voice to its 
citizens might be helpful.  
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As government effectiveness has been shown to have a negative effect on FDI, 
from an FDI point of view, continuing tighter rules and thereby speeding up the 
process and productiveness of investments is advised. It is important that the 
quality of policy formulation and enforcement are in favour of foreign investors 
along with staying committed to stated policies. Policy makers can focus on 
improving the regulatory quality to increase their openness to foreign capital. 
Overall, South and East Asia pacific countries striving to attract FDI should 
continue to design and implement governance quality in a way that encourages and 
facilitates investments from foreign investors rather than constraining such 
investments. 
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Appendix 
1 Search key words used in governance and FDI meta-regression 
analysis 
Governance – Worldwide governance indicators OR Governance OR Voice and 
Accountability OR Political Stability and Absence of Violence OR Government 
Effectiveness OR Regulatory Quality OR Rule of Law OR Control of Corruption 
Inward Foreign direct investment – FDI or Foreign direct investment OR offshore 
investment OR cross border investment OR investment abroad OR overseas investment 
OR foreign assets OR Greenfield investment OR foreign investment OR foreign ventures 
OR foreign reinvestment OR foreign assets OR non-local investments OR international 
investment OR outside investment OR non-native investment OR remote investment OR 
non-domestic investment OR non-resident investment OR distant investment OR 
investment OR invest OR inflows OR direct investment OR investment in other 
countries  
South and East Asia and Pacific countries – Emerging economies OR East Asian 
economies OR South East Asian economies OR East Asia OR South Asia OR South east 
Asia OR Afghanistan OR Bangladesh OR Bhutan OR India OR Maldives OR Nepal OR 
Pakistan OR Sri Lanka OR American Samoa OR Cambodia OR China OR Fiji OR 
Indonesia OR Kiribati OR Korea, Dem. Rep. OR Lao PDR OR Malaysia OR Marshall 
Islands OR Micronesia, Fed. Sts OR Mongolia OR Myanmar OR Palau OR Papua New 
Guinea OR Philippines OR Samoa OR Solomon Islands OR Thailand OR Timor-Leste 
OR Tuvalu OR Tonga OR Vanuatu OR Vietnam OR Asean OR Developing economies 
OR Developing countries 
 
2 PIOS framework 
Population – The study should focus on South and East Asia Pacific economies or 
equivalent as specified in the search criteria. 
Independent variable – The study should be examining the impact of measures economic 
governance in terms of a scale or its equivalent as specified in the search criteria. 
Outcome variable – The study should be examining inward foreign direct investment or 
as defined in the search criteria. 
Study design – Study design can be either theoretical or empirical. A study is considered 
to be theoretical if it is based on some theoretical model drawing, verbal or mathematical 
conclusions analysing impact of economic governance on economic growth. A study is 
considered to be empirical if it is based on regression model and draws an estimation 
model to estimate economic governance on economic growth. 
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3 Number of studies satisfying PIOS criteria 
Criteria  Number of 
studies satisfying 
the criteria 
Population (South and East Asia and Pacific countries) 94 
Independent variable (Measures of governance) 62 
Outcome variable (Inward foreign direct investments) 68 
Study design c Empirical  94 
Decision Select if all 4 criteria match – PIOS 
Select for the next stage  40 
Deselect studies  91 
 
 
4 Descriptive statistics of moderator variables  
Moderator 
variable 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Ptype1 =1 if the estimate is from an article published 
in the journal; = 0 otherwise 
0.544 0.50 
Ptype2 =1 if the estimate is from unpublished study; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.456 0.50 
Specific fdi =1 if the model uses FDI data on single 
country; = 0 otherwise 
0.020 0.14 
Non-
specificfdi 
=1 if the model uses FDI data on more than 
one country FDI; = 0 otherwise 
0.980 0.14 
Yearly =1 if the model uses yearly data on FDI; = 0 
otherwise 
0.526 0.50 
Non-yearly =1 if the model uses non-yearly data on FDI; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.474 0.50 
Data1 =1 if the model uses panel data; = 0 
otherwise 
0.579 0.49 
Data2 =1 if the model uses cross sectional data; = 0 
otherwise 
0.421 0.49 
Fdi1 =1 if the model uses levels of FDI; = 0 
otherwise 
0.119 0.32 
Fdi2 =1 if the model uses relative figures of FDI; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.092 0.29 
continued 
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Moderator 
variable 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Fdi3 =1 if the model uses the natural logarithm of 
FDI; = 0 otherwise 
0.788 0.41 
Country1 =1 if the estimate belongs to South Asia; = 0 
otherwise 
0.007 0.08 
Country2 =1 if the estimate belongs to Mixed 
countries; = 0 otherwise 
0.993 0.08 
Method1 =1 if the model is estimated using OLS 
technique; = 0 otherwise 
0.417 0.49 
Method2 =1 if the model is estimated using panel data 
technique; = 0 otherwise 
0.377 0.48 
Method3 =1 if the model is estimated using 
instrumental variable technique; = 0 
otherwise 
0.132 0.34 
Method4 =1 if the model is estimated using the time 
series technique; = 0 otherwise 
0.073 0.26 
Method5 =1 if the model is estimated using another 
technique; = 0 otherwise 
0.001 0.34 
Lauthor1 =1 if the first author of the study is 
American; = 0 otherwise 
0.462 0.50 
Lauthor2 =1 if the first author of the study is European; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.307 0.46 
Lauthor3 =1 if the first author of the study is South and 
East Asian; = 0 otherwise 
0.047 0.21 
Lauthor4 =1 if the first author of the study is from 
another region; = 0 otherwise 
0.184 0.39 
Subject1 =1 if the estimate is taken from a study that 
belongs to Economics and Finance 
discipline; = 0 otherwise 
0.551 0.50 
Subject2 =1 if the estimate is taken from a study that 
belongs to Business Management and 
Accounting discipline; = 0 otherwise 
0.161 0.37 
Subject3 =1 if the estimate is taken from a study that 
belongs to Policy discipline; = 0 otherwise 
0.208 0.41 
Subject4 =1 if the estimate is taken from a study that 
belongs to Development discipline; = 0 
otherwise 
0.069 0.25 
Subject5 =1 if the estimate is taken from a study that 
belongs to Law discipline; = 0 otherwise 
0.011 0.11 
continued 
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Moderator 
variable 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Dumchi1 =1 if the model includes China in the sample 
countries; = 0 otherwise 
0.975 0.16 
Dumchi2 =1 if the model excludes China from the 
sample countries; = 0 otherwise 
0.025 0.16 
Dumsk1 =1 if the model includes South Korea in the 
sample countries; = 0 otherwise 
0.849 0.36 
Dumsk2 =1 if the model excludes South Korea from 
the sample countries; = 0 otherwise 
0.151 0.36 
Form1 =1 if the model uses merger and acquisition 
form of FDI; = 0 otherwise 
0.089 0.28 
Form2 =1 if the model uses aggregate FDI; = 0 
otherwise 
0.911 0.28 
Flow1 =1 if the model uses stock of FDI; = 0 
otherwise 
0.048 0.21 
Flow2 =1 if the model uses the flow of FDI; = 0 
otherwise 
0.952 0.21 
Indi1 =1 if the model includes governance as the 
main independent variable; = 0 otherwise 
0.964 0.19 
Indi2 =1 if the model includes governance as a 
control variable; = 0 otherwise 
0.036 0.19 
Dosurce1 =1 if model uses data on FDI from IMF 
database; = 0 otherwise 
0.037 0.19 
Dsource2 =1 if model uses data on FDI from OECD 
database; = 0 otherwise 
0.054 0.23 
Dsource3 =1 if model uses data on FDI from other 
databases; = 0 otherwise 
0.221 0.41 
Dsource4 =1 if model uses data on FDI from UNCTAD 
database; = 0 otherwise 
0.189 0.39 
Dsource5 =1 if model uses data on FDI from World 
Bank database; = 0 otherwise 
0.499 0.50 
Idsource1 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from BERI database; = 0 
otherwise 
0.021 0.14 
Idsource2 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from the Freedom House 
database; = 0 otherwise 
0.037 0.19 
Idsource3 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from the ICRG database; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.242 0.43 
continued 
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Moderator 
variable 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Idsource4 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from other sources; = 0 
otherwise 
0.193 0.39 
Idsource5 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from the PRS database; = 
0 otherwise 
0.029 0.17 
Idsource6 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from Polity database; = 0 
otherwise 
0.120 0.33 
Idsource7 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from the Transparency 
International database; = 0 otherwise 
0.042 0.20 
Idsource8 =1 if the data for the governance measure in 
the model is taken from the World Wide 
Governance Indicators from the World Bank 
database; = 0 otherwise 
0.315 0.46 
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5. Summaries of empirical studies included in meta-regression analysis 
Authors and year 
 
Sample size Study period Dependent variable and 
source 
Independent variable and 
source 
Methodology Findings 
Gastanaga et al., 
(1998) 
49 less 
developed 
countries 
1970–1995 Aggregate inward FDI in 
millions of US dollars 
(taken as FDI to GDP ratio) 
Source: IMF, Balance of 
Payments 
Statistics Yearbook 
Various institutional 
variables – bureaucracy 
and corruption 
Source: Various sources 
Pooled cross section 
and time 
 series data 
Bureaucracy – negative 
and significant 
Corruption – positive and 
significant 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002a) 
115 developing 
and developed 
countries 
1995–1997 US FDI 
Source: Bureau of Economic 
Analysis  
(both aggregate FDI flows  
and industry specific (2 high 
 technology industries)) 
World governance 
indicators  
Source: World Bank 
(Kaufman et al. 1999) 
Cross sectional data Law – positive and Insig- 
nificant 
Voice and accountability – 
positive and significant 
Political instability – 
positive and insignificant 
Government effectiveness 
– positive and significant 
Regulation – positive and  
significant 
Corruption – positive and 
significant 
 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002b) 
114 developing  
and developed  
countries 
1995–1997 Net inward FDI (=inward FDI 
– FDI outflows) averaged 
1995–1997. 
Source: The world investment 
report, UNCTAD (1998) 
Annex B 
World governance 
indicators 
Source: World Bank 
Cross sectional Governance – positive and 
significant  
Hsiao and Shen 
(2003) 
23 developing 
 countries 
1976–1997 Total inward FDI flows as a 
percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) (in percentage 
values). 
Source: World Development 
Indicator CD Rom (2000) 
Governance institutions Panel data Absence of corruption – 
positive and insignificant 
Anghel (2004) 80 countries  1996–2000 Net FDI as a percentage of 
average GDP 
Source: World Bank 
Governance institutions (5 
indicators are used gov-
ernment effectiveness,  
regulatory quality, rule of 
Cross sectional data Political stability – positive 
and significant 
Government effectiveness 
– positive and significant 
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law and control of cor- 
ruption) 
Source: World Bank 
 governance indicators, 
Kaufman et al. (2004) 
Rule of law – positive and 
significant 
Control of corruption –  
positive and significant 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2004) 
154 countries 1995–2001 Merger and Acquisition in- 
flows. 
Source: UNCTAD 
Governance indicators. 
Source: World Bank, 
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data Governance – positive and 
significant 
Gani (2007) 17 countries from 
Asia and Latin  
America 
4 periods –  
1996, 1998, 
2002, 2004 
FDI as a share of GDP 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
Governance indicators. 
Source: World Bank, 
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data Rule of law – positive and 
significant 
Control of corruption – 
positive and significant 
Hur et al. (2007) 172 countries 1995–2002 Merger and Acquisition flows 
Source: UNCTAD 
Governance indicators. 
Source: World Bank, 
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data Governance – positive and 
significant 
Adeoye (2009) 33 emerging  
countries 
1997–2002 Inwards FDI as % of GDP 
Source: World Bank 
Governance indicators. 
Source: World Bank, 
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data Governance – positive and 
significant 
Wernick et al. 
(2009) 
64 emerging 
 economies 
1996–2006 Inward FDI measured in  
millions of US dollars 
Source: World Bank 
Overall governance 
Source: World Bank,  
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data 
OLS technique 
Governance – Positive and 
significant 
Ali et al.,(2010) 69 countries 
Sectoral analysis 
1981–2005 FDI net inflows expressed as 
a percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
Institutional quality com- 
prising of an investment 
profile index and law and 
order / Source: ICRG 
Panel data Governance – positive and 
significant 
Muhammad et al. 
(2011) 
7 Asian economies 1996–2007 Inward FDI 
Source: Central banks of each 
country 
Institutional quality 
Source: World Bank, 
 Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data – Fixed 
effect and Random 
effect model 
Governance – positive and 
significant effect 
Jadhav (2012) 5 BRICS nations 
(Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and 
South Africa) 
2000–2009 Inward FDI in billion dollars 
Source: World Bank 
Voice and accountability 
Government effectiveness 
Regulatory quality 
Rule of law Corruption 
Political stability 
Panel data Regulatory quality – posi-
tive and insignificant 
Rule of law – positive and 
significant 
Democracy – negative and 
significant 
Political stability – nega- 
tive and insignificant 
Control of corruption –  
positive and insignificant 
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Luca and  
Spatafora (2012) 
103 countries  2001–2007 Private capital flows (which 
includes debt and equity) as a 
share of nominal GDP 
Source: Global development 
finance, World Bank (2011) 
World governance 
 indicators  
Source: World Bank 
Cross country and 
panel data analysis – 
OLS, IV, GMM 
techniques 
Mixed results both in effect 
and significance 
Habib and  
Zurawicki (2001) 
111 countries 1994–1998 Source: International  
Monetary Fund 
Corruption / Source: 
Private risk assessment 
company 
Panel data - OLS Corruption – negative and 
significant 
Wei (2001) 93 countries 1994–1996 Source: OECD Corruption / Source: 
World development  
indicators 
Panel data – random 
effects model 
Corruption – negative and 
significant 
Teksoz (2004) 102 countries 1995–2000 Net inward FDI as a 
 percentage of GDP (GDP 
 measured in current inter- 
national dollars) / Source:  
World development indicators 
Corruption / Source:  
Global competitiveness  
reports 
Panel data – OLS, 
2SLS 
Corruption – positive and 
significant 
Voyer and  
Beamish (2004) 
59 countries 2000–2001 Japanese FDI per capita 
Source: Toyo Keizai 
Corruption / Source: The 
Transparency 
International Corruption 
Index (CPI) – 2002 
Cross sectional – 
linear regression 
Corruption – positive and 
significant in case of 
emerging economies. 
Positive and insignificant 
in case of industrialised 
Straub and 
Edinburgh (2005) 
106 countries 1995–1999 FDI flows as a share of total 
private capital flows 
Source: IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics Database 
Corruption  / Source:  
Corruption Index from 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Panel data Corruption –  negative and 
significant 
Dahlstrom and 
Johnson (2007) 
99 countries  1996–2002 Total annual flows of FDI 
millions of US$ 
Source: World development 
indicator (2004) 
Corruption / Source: 
Transparency Interna- 
tional Corruption Percep- 
tion Index (2004) 
Panel data – Ran- 
dom effects model 
Corruption – negative and 
significant 
Khamfula (2007) 18 countries 1994–2004 FDI/Nominal GDP 
Source: IMF International 
Finance Statistics 
Corruption / Source: 
Centre for corruption 
research 
Panel data – Fixed 
effects 
Corruption – positive and 
significant effect 
Sadig (2009) 
 
 
117 countries 1984–2004 FDI per capita 
Source: UNCTAD 
Corruption / Source:  
International country risk 
guide (ICRG) 
Panel data – OLS Corruption – negative and 
significant 
Woo and Heo 
(2009) 
8 non-OECD  
countries 
1984–2004 Ratio of a nations share in 
world inward FDI to its share 
in global GDP / Source:  
Corruption level / Source: 
International country risk 
guide (ICRG) 
Panel data Corruption – negative and 
significant 
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UNCTAD Democracy – negative and 
insignificant (Non OECD 
Asian countries) 
Democracy – positive and 
significant in case of  
Mathur and Singh 
(2013) 
29 countries  
(emerging or de- 
veloping) 
1980–2000 Net inward FDI / Source: IMF Corruption perception Panel data - Random 
effects GLS 
Corruption – positive and 
significant 
Singh and Jun 
 (1995) 
31 countries 1970–1993 RFDI = FDI flows in constant 
dollars relative to real GDP. 
Source: World Debt tables, 
World Bank. 
Political risk index. 
Source: Business Environ- 
ment Risk Intelligence, 
S.A. (BERI) 
Pooled time series 
and cross sectional 
analysis. 
Political risk – positive 
effect but the results are not 
robust 
Busse and 
Hefeker (2005) 
83 developing 
countries 
1984–2003 FDI net inflows per capita in 
current US dollars (FDI). 
Source: UNCTAD (2005). 
12 category  political risk 
Index and institutions 
Source: International 
 Country Risk Guide 
 (ICRG) 
Panel data Government stability,  
absence of internal conflict 
and tensions, democratic 
rights, law and order have 
a significant effect  
Baek and Qian  
(2011) 
22 industrialised 
and 94 developing 
countries 
1984–2008 Stock of FDI in the host 
country. 
  
12 category  political risk 
Index and institutions 
Source: International  
Country Risk Guide  
(ICRG) 
Panel data – Basic 
gravity model 
Political stability – positive 
and significant effect in 
case of all and developing 
countries. 
Zheng (2011) 135 developing 
 countries 
1980–2008 FDI net inflows as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. 
Democracy 
Source: Henisz’s (2000a) 
political constraints index 
polcon. 
Time series cross 
sectional data 
Democracy – positive and 
significant 
Li and Resnick  
(2003) 
53 countries  1982–1995 FDI net inflows measured in 
billions of current US dollars. 
Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
Democracy – Polity IV 
Property rights protection 
index / Source: Stephen 
Knack and Philip Keefer 
for the IRIS centre at the 
University of Maryland. 
Pooled time-series 
cross section data 
Democracy has both  
positive and negative  
effects 
Ahlquist (2006) 80 developing 
 countries 
1985–2002 Net inward FDI. 
Source: World Bank 
Institutional quality Unbalanced panel 
time series 
Governance  – positive and 
significant 
Goodspeed et 
al. (2010) 
53 countries for tax 
rates. 
47 countries for the 
corruption index. 
 
1984–2002 
for tax rates. 
1995–2002 
for corrup- 
tion index. 
Aggregate stock of FDI 
Source: UNCTAD. 
FDI stock of destination  
country / Source: OECD 
Policy variables = Infra- 
structure quality 
Source: World Bank. 
Good governance = cor- 
Panel data Overall governance = neg-
ative and significant 
Corruption = negative and 
insignificant and signifi- 
cant 
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37 countries for 
infrastructure 
index. 
1996–2002 
for infrastruc-
ture index.  
ruption perception index 
and government effi- 
ciency. 
Corruption perception  
index  
Source: Transparency 
International. 
Government efficiency 
Source: IMD Competi-
tiveness Yearbook.  
 
Arbatli (2011) 46 countries 1990–2009 FDI as a percentage of FDI. 
Source: IFS, World Invest- 
ment Report Database. 
Law and order; 
bureaucracy quality 
ICRG 
Panel data Law and order – negative 
and insignificant 
Bureaucracy – negative 
and insignificant 
Davis (2011) 109 states 1980–2005 Inward FDI in millions of US 
dollars. 
Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI, World  
Bank, 2007). 
Democracy 
Source: Polity IV 
Cross sectional time 
series 
Democracy – negative and 
insignificant 
Gordon et al. 
(2012) 
124 countries 1996–2009 Foreign direct investment in-
flow data in current US dol-
lars. 
Source: World development 
indicator (WDI) database 
published by the World Bank. 
 
Democracy, Political 
stability, corruption, regu-
lation, government effect-
tiveness and law 
Source: World Bank,  
Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Panel data All governance variables 
show mixed effects 
 
Fan et al. (2009) 61 countries 1961–2003 Per capita FDI in constant 
2000 US$ winsorized at 5%. 
Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 
database. 
Rule of Law. 
Source: International  
Country Risk Guide. 
Panel data. Law – positive and 
significant 
Busse et al. (2011) 82 countries 1984–2004 Absolute bilateral inward 
FDI. / Source: UNCTAD. 
Political risk 
Source: International  
Country Risk Guide. 
Panel data Political stability – positive 
and significant 
Harms and  
Ursprung (2002) 
62 developing and 
emerging market  
countries 
1989–1997 Average level of per capita 
FDI. 
Source: World Bank. 
Democracy 
Source: Freedom House 
(2000) 
Panel data Democracy - Positive but 
statistically mixed effect 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  38 
Jensen (2003) 79 countries for  
cross sectional  
data. 
114 countries for 
time-series cross- 
sectional data. 
1990–Cross 
sectional. 
 
1970–1997 
for time- 
series cross- 
sectional 
data. 
Cross sectional - Average net 
inward FDI as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Time-series cross-sectional – 
Annual inward FDI as a  
percentage of GDP.  
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 1999. 
Democracy – Polity III 
data Jagger and Gurr 
1996;  
Corruption, Rule of law, 
Corruption and  
Bureaucracy – Easterly 
Data Set, Easterly 1999 
Cross sectional data 
for 1999;  
Time series cross-
sectional analysis 
Democracy has positive 
and significant effect; 
others – insignificant  
Jensen and 
McGillivray 
(2005) 
 
115 countries 1975–1995 Inward FDI as a percentage of 
GDP / Source: World Bank’s 
World Development 
Indicators, 1999. 
Democracy 
Source: Marshall and  
Jaggers (2000). 
Cross-sectional time-
series data 
Democracy –  positive and 
significant 
Busse (2004) 69 developing and 
emerging market 
countries 
1972–2001 Foreign direct investment per 
capita, net inflows in current 
US dollars. 
Source: UNCTAD, 2003. 
Democracy 
Source: Freedom House 
(2002) data for political 
rights and civil liberties. 
Panel data Democracy – positive and 
significant effect from 
1990 onwards 
Blanton and 
Blanton (2007) 
Non-OECD 
countries 
1980–2003 Net inward FDI as a per- 
centage of total GDP. 
Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank, 2005. 
Democracy 
Source: Developed by  
Stohl, Gibney, Poe and 
Co-researchers. 
Time-series cross-
sectional data 
Democracy – positive and 
significant 
Choi (2008) 
 
Developing 
countries 
20 years Foreign direct investment as a 
ratio of GDP in dollar  
amounts. 
Democracy  
Source: Polity IV 
Pooled panel data Democracy – positive and 
significant 
Guerin and  
Manzocchi (2009) 
 
 
14 OECD source 
countries and 24 
emerging host  
countries. 
 
1992–2004 Bilateral gross inward FDI 
from source country to host 
country in constant 2000 US 
dollars. 
Source: OECD International 
Direct Investment Database 
(2006 release). 
Democracy 
Source: The Freedom 
House Political Right 
 index. 
Panel data Democracy – negative and 
significant 
Doces (2010) 
 
55 countries  1990–1999 Inward flows of FDI mea- 
sured in millions of dollars. 
Source: World Bank. 
Democracy 
Source: Polity IV 
Panel data Democracy – positive and 
significant 
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6. Overview of study 
Field  Search 
engines 
used 
Types of 
studies 
included 
Effect size Number of 
studies 
(estimates) 
Countries  Aim of the 
 study 
Measures 
of gov- 
ernment 
and FDI 
Google, 
Web of 
Knowledge 
English 
language 
studies – 
 published 
and 
unpublished 
Partial 
correlation 
48 (771*) South 
and East 
Asia and 
Pacific 
countries 
as de- 
fined by  
world 
bank +  
South 
Korea 
Parameter 
estimate and  
heterogeneity  
*Total number of estimates (combining all measures of governance) 7. Precision Effect Test (PET) 
 
7.1 Simple meta regression – Precision effect test (PET) 
 Voice and  
accounta-
bility 
Political 
stability 
Govern-
ment ef- 
fectiveness 
Regu-
lation 
Law Corrup-
tion 
Aggre-
gate gov-
ernance 
PET  
(Unweig
hted) 
-0.03 
(-1.70) 
R2=0.25 
0.02 
(0.35) 
R2=0.05 
0.05 
(0.74) 
R2=0.03 
0.08 
(2.44) 
R2=0.46 
0.04 
(1.60) 
R2=0.0
9 
-0.05 
(-1.73) 
R2=0.1
2 
0.08 
(1.44) 
R2=0.02 
PET 
(Weighte
d) 
-0.02 
(3.65) 
R2=0.08 
0.10 
(3.50) 
R2=0.13 
0.00 
(0.01) 
R2=0.01 
0.09 
(2.43) 
R2=0.55 
0.13 
(11.33) 
R2=0.1
9 
-0.04 
(-1.00) 
R2=0.1
0 
0.04 
(0.91) 
R2=0.02 
N 149 154 36 51 42 166 62 
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7.2 Multiple meta regression – Precision effect test (PET) 
 Voice and  
accountabi-
lity 
Political 
stability 
Govern-
ment  
effective-
ness 
Regula-
tion 
Law Corrup-
tion 
Aggre-
gate gov-
ernance 
PET 
(Weigh
ted) 
0.12 
(6.03) 
Adj.R2=0.8
7 
-0.96 
(-6.10) 
Adj.R2=
0.90 
0.17 
(2.37) 
Adj.R2=0
.14 
0.66 
(8.05) 
Adj.R2=
0.80 
0.27 
(4.53) 
Adj.R2=
0.76 
0.10 
(1.71) 
Adj.R2=
0.71 
0.07 
(2.19) 
Adj.R2=
0.42 
PET 
(Cluste
red) 
0.12 
(2.43) 
R2=0.88 
-0.96 
(-4.17) 
R2=0.91 
0.17 
(7.95) 
R2=0.19 
0.66 
(6.72) 
R2=0.81 
0.27 
(12.40) 
R2=0.79 
0.10 
(1.35) 
R2=0.73 
0.07 
(1.51)] 
R2=0.45 
N 149 154 36 51 42 166 62 
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Notes 
1. Similar to corruption, political stability was considered in two ways – political 
stability and political instability. For aggregating these studies, political 
instability was transformed into political stability by inversion and multiplying 
both coefficient and t-value with –1. 
2. Low governance should be interpreted as less democracy, low political 
stability, less regulation, lower levels of government effectiveness, less of rule 
of law, high corruption and low overall governance. 
3. We have tested for publication bias using Funnel Asymmetric Test (FAT) and 
Precision Effect Test (PET). While FAT suggests the presence of publication 
bias and PET confirms the genuine effect of these measures on FDI beyond 
publication bias. We have explored these aspects in a different study. 
4. We see the same downward trend in these graphs taking an end year of sample 
period instead of an average year. 
5. There were about 15 different types of interaction terms ranging from a 
minimum of 1 to a maximum of 11 observations. 
6. There were only 2 different non-linear terms with less than 12 observations. 
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  42 
References 
ADDISON, T. and HESHMATI, A. (2003). The new global determinants of FDI flows to 
developing countries: The importance of ICT and democratization. WIDER 
Discussion Paper, 45.  
https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/new-global-determinants-fdi-flows-
developing-countries  
ADEOYE, A. (2009). Macro-economic level corporate governance and FDI in emerging 
markets: Is there a close relationship?  
http://www.academicjournals.org/journal/JEIF/article-full-text-pdf/188F89A1880 
AHN, Y.S., ADJI, S.S. and WILLETT, T.D. (1998). The effects of inflation and exchange 
rate policies on direct investment to developing countries. International Economic 
Journal, 12(1): 95–104.  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10168739800000006  
AKISIK, O. and PFEIFFER, R. (2009). Globalization, US foreign investments and ac-
counting standards. Review of Accounting and Finance, 8(1): 5–37. 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/14757700910934210  
ALI, F. A., FIESS, N. and MACDONALD, R. (2010). Do institutions matter for foreign 
direct investment? Open Economies Review, 21(2): 201–209. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11079-010-9170-4  
ANGHEL, B. (2004). Do institutions affect foreign direct investment? International 
Doctorate in Economic Analysis, Universidad Autonoma De Barcelona. 
http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/SAE/2005/217/paperFDI.pdf  
ARBATLI, E. (2011). Economic policies and FDI inflows to emerging market economies. 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/192.  
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25160.0  
AZÉMAR, C. and DESBORDES, R. (2010). Short-run strategies for attracting foreign 
direct investment. World Economy, 33(7): 928–957. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01226.x/full  
BAEK, K. and QIAN, X. (2011). An analysis of political risks and the flow of foreign 
direct investment in developing and industrialized economies. Economics, 
Management and Financial Markets, 6(4): 60–91. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1008888780?pq-origsite=gscholar  
BINICI, M., HUTCHISON, M. and SCHINDLER, M. (2010). Controlling capital? Legal 
restrictions and the asset composition of international financial flows. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 29(4): 666–684. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560610000021  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  43 
BLANTON, S.L. and BLANTON, R.G. (2007). What attracts foreign investors? An 
examination of human rights and foreign direct investment. Journal of Politics, 69(1): 
143–155. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00500.x/full  
BROUTHERS, L.E., GAO, Y. and JASON PATRICK MCNICOL (2008). Corruption and 
market attractiveness influences on different types of FDI. Strategic Management 
Journal, 29(6): 673–680. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/smj.669/abstract/ . 
BRUNETTI, A. and WEDER, B. (1998). Investment and institutional uncertainty: A 
comparative study of different uncertainty measures. Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv/Review of World Economics, 134(3): 513–533. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40440663?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  
BUSSE, M. (2004). Transnational corporations and repression of political rights and civil 
liberties: An empirical analysis. KYKLOS, 57(1): 45–66. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00242.x/abstract  
BUSSE, M. and HEFEKER, C. (2007). Political risk, institution and foreign direct 
investment. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(2): 397–415. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268006000267  
BUSSE, M., NUNNENKAMP, P. and SPATAREANU, M. (2011). Foreign direct 
investment and labour rights: A panel analysis of bilateral FDI flows. Applied 
Economics Letters, 18: 149–152. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504850903559500  
CHOI, S.-W. and SAMY, Y. (2008). Re-examining the effect of democratic institutions on 
inflows of foreign direct investment in developing countries. Foreign Policy Analysis, 
4(1): 83–103. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00059.x/abstract  
COLE, M.A., ELLIOTT, R.J.R. and JING, Z. (2009). Corruption, governance and FDI 
location in China: A province-level analysis. Journal of Development Studies, 45(9): 
1494–1512. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220380902890276  
CYRUS, T.L., ISCAN, T.B. and STARKY, S. (2006). Investor protection and international 
investment positions: An empirical analysis. International Finance, 9, 197–221. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2006.00181.x/full  
DAHLSTROM, T. and JOHNSON, A. (2007). Bureaucratic corruption, MNEs and FDI. 
CESIS Electronic Working Paper Series, 82. 
https://static.sys.kth.se/itm/wp/cesis/cesiswp82.pdf  
DAVIS, G. D. (2011). Regional trade agreements and foreign direct investment. Politics 
and Policy, 39(3): 401–419. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00296.x/full  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  44 
DOCES, J.A. (2010). The Dynamics of democracy and direct investment: An empirical 
analysis. Polity, 42: 329–351 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/polity/journal/v42/n3/abs/pol20101a.html  
DOUCOULIAGOS, H, and ULUBAŞOĞLU, M. (2008), Democracy and economic 
growth: A meta-analysis, American Journal of Political Science, 52(1): 61–83. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193797  
DOUCOULIAGOS, H. IAMSIRARAOJ, S. and ULUBASOGLU, M. A. (2010). Foreign 
Direct Investment and Economic Growth: A real relationship or wishful thinking? 
Deakin University Working Paper SWP 2010/14. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999315002138  
DRIFFIELD, N., JONES, C. and CROTTY, J. (2012). International business research and 
risky investments, an analysis of FDI in conflict zones. International Business 
Review, 22(1): 140–155. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969593112000303  
DUNNING, J.H.(1980). Toward an eclectic theory of international production: Some 
empirical tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11(1): 9–31. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/154142  
ELO, K. Z. (2007). The effect of capital controls on foreign direct investment decisions 
under country risk with intangible asset. International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 07/79. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=20572.0  
EPPI CENTRE. (2010). EPPI Centre Methods for Conducting Systematic Reviews. 
Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre, Institute of 
Education, University of London.  
http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=hQBu8y4uVwI%3D  
FAN, J.P.H., MORCK, R., XU, L.C. and YEUNG, B. (2009). Institutions and foreign 
direct investment: China versus the rest of the world. World development, 37(4): 852–
865. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X08003392  
GANI, A. (2007). Governance and foreign direct investment links: Evidence from panel 
data estimations. Applied Economics Letters, 14(1): 753–756. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504850600592598  
GASTANAGA, V.M., NUGENT, J.B. and PASHAMOVA, B. (1998). Host country 
reforms and FDI inflows: How much difference do they make? World Development, 
26(7): 1299–1314. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X98000497  
GLOBERMAN, S. and SHAPIRO, D. (2002a). Global foreign direct investment flows: 
The role of governance infrastructure. World Development, 30(11): 1899–1919. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X02001109  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  45 
GLOBERMAN, S. and SHAPIRO, D. (2002b). Governance infrastructure and US foreign 
direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(1), 19–39. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557137?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  
GOODSPEED, T., MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ, J. and ZHANG, L. (2011). Public policies 
and FDI location: differences between developing and developed countries. 
Finanzarchiv, 67. 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/fa/2011/00000067/00000002/art00005  
GORDON, L. A., LOEB, M. P. and ZHU, W. (2012). The impact of IFRS adoption on 
foreign direct investment. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31(4): 374–398. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425412000439  
GUERIN, S. S. and MANZOCCHI, S. (2009). Political regime and FDI from advanced to 
emerging countries. Review of World Economics/ Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 145(1): 
75–91. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10290-009-0004-7  
HABIB, M. and ZURAWICKI, L. (2001). Country-level investments and the effect of 
corruption - some empirical evidence. International Business Review, 10(6): 687–700. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969593101000385  
HAGGARD, S. (2004). Institutions and growth in East Asia. Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 38( 4): 53–81. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02686328  
HARMS, P. and URSPUNG, H.W. (2002). Do civil and political repression really boost 
foreign direct investments? Economic Inquiry, 40(4): 651–663. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1093/ei/40.4.651/pdf 
HE, C., WANG, J. and CHENG, S. (2011). What attracts foreign direct investment in 
China's real estate development? Annals of Regional Science, 46(2): 267–293. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00168-009-0341-4  
HUR, J., PARINDURI, R. A. and RIYANTO, Y. E. (2011). Cross-border M&A inflows 
and quality of country governance: developing versus developed countries. Pacific 
Economic Review, 16(5): 633–655. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00568.x/full  
JADHAV, P. (2012). Determinants of foreign direct investment in BRICS economies: 
Analysis of economic, institutional and political factor. Procedia – Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, 37: 5–14. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042812007495  
JENSEN, N. and MCGILLIVRAY, F. (2005). Federal institutions and multinational 
investors: Federalism, government credibility, and foreign direct investment. 
International Interactions, 31(4): 303–325. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050620500303365  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  46 
KAUFMANN, D., KRAAY, A. and ZOIDO-LOBATON, P. (1999). Aggregating gover-
nance indicators. World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2195. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1999/10/440006/aggregating-governance-
indicators  
KHAMFULA, Y. (2007). Foreign direct investment and economic growth in EP and IS 
countries: The role of corruption. World Economy, 30(12): 1843–1855. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01055.x/full  
LEE, C. H. (2002). The state and institutions in East Asian economic development: The 
past and the future. The Journal of the Korean Economy, 3(1): 1–17. 
LEE, J-Y. and MANSFIELD, E. (1996). Intellectual property protection and U.S. foreign 
direct investment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(2): 181–186. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109919  
LI, Q. and RESNICK, A. (2003). Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign 
direct inflows to developing countries. International Organization, 57(1): 175–211. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=138659
&fileId=S0020818303571077  
LUCA, O. and SPATAFORA, N. (2012) Capital inflows, financial development and 
domestic investment: Determinants and inter-relationships. IMF Working Paper 
Number, 120. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12120.pdf  
MATHUR, A. and SINGH, K. (2013). Foreign direct investment, Corruption and demo-
cracy. Applied Economics, 45(8): 991–1002. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036846.2011.613786   
MAYER, T. (2006). Policy coherence for development: A background paper on foreign 
direct investment, OECD Publishing, Working Paper No. 253.  
http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/37238110.pdf  
MUHAMMAD, A., HASHIM, K., IMRAN, H. A., MUSHTAQ, A. H., and IRFAN, C. M. 
(2011). Institutions, macroeconomic policy and foreign direct investment: South 
Asian countries case. Munich Personal RePEc Archive paper, 32480. 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32480/  
NIGH, D. and SCHOLLHAMMER, H. (1987). Foreign direct investment, political conflict 
and co-operation: The asymmetric response hypothesis. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 8(4), 307–312.  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.4090080407/abstract 
NORTH, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge University Press. 
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  47 
NUNNENKAMP, P. and SPATZ, J. (2004). Intellectual property rights and foreign direct 
investment: A disaggregated analysis. Review of World Economics, 140(3): 393–414. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02665982  
QIAN, X. SANDOVAL-HERNANDEZ, J. and GARRETT, J. Z. (2016). Corruption 
distance and foreign direct investment. Emerging Trade and Finance, 52(2): 400–419. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1540496X.2015.1047301  
RAI, R. K. (2009). Effects of the TRIPS-mandated intellectual property rights on foreign 
direct investment in developing countries: A case study of the Indian pharmaceutical 
industry. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 11(5/6): 404–431. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1796.2008.00340.x/abstract  
SADIG, A. A. (2009). The effects of corruption on FDI inflows. Cato Journal, 29(2) 267–
294. http://www.indytruth.org/library/journals/catojournal/29/cj29n2-4.pdf  
SEYOUM, B. (1996). The impact of intellectual property rights on foreign direct 
investment. The Columbia Journal of World Business, 31(1): 50–59. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002254289690006X  
SINGH, H. and JUN, K. W. (1995). Some new evidence on determinants of foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. Policy Research Working Paper, 1531. 
STANLEY, T.D and DOUCOULIAGOS, H. (2012). Meta-regression analysis in 
Economics and Business. Oxford Routledge. 
STRAUB, S. (2005). Opportunism, corruption and the multinational firm's mode of entry. 
Journal of International Economics, 74(2): 245–263. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199607000967  
TEKSOZ, A.U. (2004). Corruption and foreign direct investment: An empirical analysis. 
Working Paper. http://www.edge-page.net/jamb2004/teksoz.pdf  
VOYER, P.A. and BEAMISH, P. W. (2004). The effect of corruption on Japanese foreign 
direct investment. Journal of Business Ethics, 50(3): 211–224. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FB%3ABUSI.0000024737.57926.bf  
WANG, X., XU, L.C. and ZHU, T. (2011). Foreign direct investment under a weak rule of 
law: Theory and evidence from China. Economics of Transition, 20: 401–424. 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/5790.html   
WEI, S.J. (2000). Local corruption and global capital flows. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, No. 2.  
http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/bpea/papers/2000/local-corruption-wei  
  
 www.economics-ejournal.org  48 
WERNICK, D. A. and HAAR, J. (2009). Do governing institutions affect foreign direct 
investment inflows? New evidence from emerging economies. International Journal 
of Economics and Business Research, 1(3): 317–332. 
http://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJEBR.2009.024307  
WOO, J.Y. and HEO, U. (2009). Corruption and foreign direct investment attractiveness in 
Asia. Asian Politics and Policy, 1(2): 223–238. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2009.01113.x/abstract  
YACKEE, J. W. (2008). Bilateral investment treaties, credible commitment, and the rule of 
(international) law: Do BITs promote foreign direct investment? Law and Society 
Review, 42(4): 805–832. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2008.00359.x/abstract  
ZHANG, J. and FU, X. (2008). FDI and environmental regulations in China. Journal of the 
Asia Pacific Economy, 13(3): 332–353. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13547860802131326  
ZHENG, Y. (2011). Credibility and flexibility: Political institutions, governance, and 
foreign direct investment. International Interactions, 37(3): 293–319. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2011.596008  
                 
  
 
 
 
 
Please note:  
You are most sincerely encouraged to participate in the open assessment of this article. You 
can do so by either recommending the article or by posting your comments.  
Please go to:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2016-11     
 
 
 
The Editor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Author(s) 2016. Licensed under the Creative Commons License - Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).  
 
 
 
  
 
